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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 08/07/2011 Accident number: 727 
Accident time: 10:15 Accident Date: 19/01/2009 






Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 18/02/2009 
ID original source: None Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 08/07/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
use of pick (?) 
Inadequate detector pinpointing 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 




The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons 
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting 
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more 
information becomes available. 
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
 
File date: 18th Feb 2009 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT - 05 DEMINING ACCIDENT 
INTRODUCTION:  
An investigation team was convened by AMAC Gardiz to investigate the de-mining accident 
involving [the Victim] the De-miner from [Demining group] DT-05. The accident occurred at 
10:15 hours on 19 January 2008 [sic] at minefield number AF/0718/08510/MF017, located in 
Nargaci village, Chamkani district of Paktiya province.                                                                                            
SUMMARY: 
Minefield # AF/0718/08510/MF017 is an anti-personnel contaminated area comprised of a 
mine belts located on Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The area was mined by Russian backed 
government to protect the Chamkani district HQ of Paktya province from the attacks of their 
opposition (Mujahedeen). This minefield is located on the south side around 600m away from 
Chamkani district HQ, and in a close vicinity i.e. around 300m to the village. 
During the period of operations [Demining group] DT-05 cleared 19670m2 area and 
found/destroyed 32 AP mines and 10 SAA of ERW. 
On 19 January 2009 at 10:15 10 hours while [the Victim] was busy in excavating a detected 
signal, the explosion occurred due to PMN mine and caused the accident. Unfortunately as 
he was not fully dressed with PPE, therefore, he has got severe injuries on his face and lost 
his both eyes and some minor injuries on his hand and leg.  According to the investigation 
report, it seems that he was working with pick instead of standard excavation tool and started 
excavation directly from the centre of the signal.  
CONCLUSIONS: 
Poor supervision, carelessness of de-miner and use of wrong tools were contributing factors 
to this accident. 
RECOMMENDATIONS:  
The following points are to be considered: 
• The command group should strictly control the team members to work in accordance 
with set procedures and use standard tools during prodding and excavation. 
• Full PPE must be worn correctly during operations on a hazard area. There is no 
exception to the involved personnel.  
• The de-miner should pinpoint the signal properly, mark the point with care and 
attention and then start excavation according to the procedure. 
• The team should undergo refresher training with focus on prodding and excavation 
drill and team supervision. 
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• This is the second accident of the same team with the scenarios in the similar 
minefield; therefore, it is highly recommended that the internal QA to be strengthened 
and also frequent external QA visits to be conducted on the teams working there. 
• [Demining group] management is to take appropriate action to improve the command 
and control ability of the team command group. 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 919 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: None 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: minor Hand; minor Leg; severe Face 
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Eyes both 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "severe injuries on his face and lost his 
both eyes and some minor injuries on his hand and leg". 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the 
investigators found that the Victim was working with the wrong tool and without wearing PPE 
and his errors were not corrected. The secondary cause is listed as a Management Control 
Inadequacy because the investigators found that there was not enough internal QA and that 
the management need to improve the “command and control ability of the team command 
group”. 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years, 
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have 
been more responsible than those internationals who presume greater responsibility. 
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